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All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'Equality and Partiality' and 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1813 All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1811 Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1815 Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1812 All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8850 Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1814 Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
6479 Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
6450 Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
6447 Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
6446 In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6477 I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
6448 A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
6478 Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]