Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'Propositions' and 'On the Philosophy of Logic'

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33 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1812 All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1813 All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1811 Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1815 Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19215 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
19209 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19208 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
19207 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19214 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8850 Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1814 Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19202 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
19204 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
19210 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19212 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
19213 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]