Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1813 All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1811 Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1815 Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1812 All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18369 There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
19319 If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19320 If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23445 Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
19315 In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
23447 In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
19317 An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
23443 The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo]
23444 To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
23446 You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
23448 Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
23441 Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
23442 Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
19322 Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8850 Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1814 Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]