14 ideas
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
| 8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
| 8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
| 8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
| 8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
| 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
| 8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
| 14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
| 14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
| 14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
| 14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
| 8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |