Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims', 'Nature Without Essence' and 'Platonistic Theories of Universals'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael]
Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael]
Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]