24 ideas
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
21339 | We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil] |
21349 | Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil] |
21340 | Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil] |
21348 | In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil] |
21351 | Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil] |
21344 | If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
21350 | If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |