12 ideas
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 9329 | Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer] |
| 9330 | Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer] |
| 9328 | All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |