12 ideas
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 16674 | The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton] |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |