Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Short History of Ethics', 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' and 'Against Structural Universals'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
8013 In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
8021 The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
8006 When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
8002 Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
8012 The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
8005 'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
8001 'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
8023 My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
8022 I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
8031 Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
8008 The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre]