Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Short History of Ethics', 'The Development of Logic' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
8013 In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
8021 The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
10051 The axiom of infinity is not a truth of logic, and its adoption is an abandonment of logicism [Kneale,W and M]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
8006 When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
8002 Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
8012 The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
8005 'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
8001 'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
8023 My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
8022 I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
8031 Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
8008 The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre]