13 ideas
| 14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
| 14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| 23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
| 16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
| 12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |