11 ideas
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
| 14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
| 3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
| 4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |