15 ideas
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |