Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Priori Knowledge', 'Merely Possible Propositions' and 'Morality and the emotions'

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13 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]