Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Priori Knowledge', 'Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology' and 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism''

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11 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]