33 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
7621 | Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
22955 | Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield] |
20638 | General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close] |
20636 | Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close] |
21230 | The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
21231 | Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
20634 | General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close] |
20648 | Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein] |
21232 | Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
7626 | I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein] |