17 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
13795 | Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder] |
13798 | Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder] |
13797 | The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder] |
13794 | Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder] |
13796 | Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder] |
5987 | Alcmaeon was the first to say the brain is central to thinking [Alcmaeon, by Staden, von] |
24043 | Soul must be immortal, since it continually moves, like the heavens [Alcmaeon, by Aristotle] |