12 ideas
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
| 14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
| 16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
| 5987 | Alcmaeon was the first to say the brain is central to thinking [Alcmaeon, by Staden, von] |
| 24043 | Soul must be immortal, since it continually moves, like the heavens [Alcmaeon, by Aristotle] |