Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaphysics of Properties', 'What is a Leading Principle?' and 'Principia Ethica'

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
10468 A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
10471 Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
10749 Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
10750 Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10747 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
10748 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10719 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
10721 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
10716 There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
10720 We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10714 The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
10715 There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
10742 Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10472 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10724 Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
7963 Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
10730 If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
10727 Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
7962 Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
10722 Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10744 Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
10726 Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
10745 Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
14781 A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
10746 Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]