Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'W.V. Quine', 'On Platonism in Mathematics' and 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]