9 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |