17 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |