18 ideas
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |