11 ideas
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
16660 | Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau] |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
16626 | Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |