13 ideas
| 17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
| 17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |