18 ideas
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |