15 ideas
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |