Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning' and 'Db (ideas)'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]