Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Primary Truths' and 'The Nature of Mathematics'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]