12 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |