25 ideas
18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |