Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation' and 'The Limits of Contingency'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
18851 Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
17945 Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
17946 Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
17944 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5901 Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
5934 Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
3777 Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
3554 Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
3781 The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
3778 The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
20280 Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
3779 Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
18854 The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
3780 We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]