14 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |