Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'The Case for Contextualism' and 'Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]