9 ideas
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
23221 | The brain, and all the mental events within it, consists entirely of sensitive and rational matter [Cavendish] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |