13 ideas
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
| 22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
| 22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
| 22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
| 8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |