Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'The Origin of Forms and Qualities' and 'Mind and Body'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

28 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
15957 Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
4986 A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15965 Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16735 In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
17945 Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
17946 Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16034 Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
15953 To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
17944 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15962 Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
15964 Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
15960 Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
5001 Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
4993 If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
4982 Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
4991 Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
4994 Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4992 In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4990 The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
4998 Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4985 If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
4997 It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
15952 The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
15972 The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]