Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Defeasibility Theory' and 'Letters to Remond de Montmort'

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14 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz]