Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)' and 'Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
7426 Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
7423 Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
7420 When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
17945 Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
17946 Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
17944 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
7424 Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
7422 A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
7419 Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
7425 The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
7418 The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]