Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)' and 'reports of last days'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates]
Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato]