Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth' and 'The Case against Closure (and reply)'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]