Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Theory of Objects', 'On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic' and 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)'

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30 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
8250 So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
17697 The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17698 Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
8719 There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8971 There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]
8718 Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
6346 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
6355 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6366 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
6357 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6370 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6364 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6352 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
6372 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
6360 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]