12 ideas
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
18436 | Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |