Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Establishment of Scientific Semantics', 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' and 'Plural Quantification'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
'"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski]
A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski]
Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]