Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth' and 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
10153 In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
3745 Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
3742 Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
3744 The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
3749 What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19141 Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10048 There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski]
3746 Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10694 Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
10479 Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10157 Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
3747 Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3743 We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
3748 Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]