40 ideas
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |