14 ideas
| 13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
| 13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
| 13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
| 13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
| 13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
| 13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
| 13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 5998 | From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ] |
| 20832 | The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus] |
| 14304 | Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus] |
| 6024 | Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius] |