Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Establishment of Scientific Semantics', 'Causal Relations' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
'"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski]
A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski]
Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]