13 ideas
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
19378 | Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R] |
18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa] |
18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa] |
18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa] |
19380 | Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R] |
18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa] |