Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Establishment of Scientific Semantics', 'Seven Types of Atheism' and 'A Priori'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
17713 After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13338 '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
13337 A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
13335 Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski]
13336 A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
13339 A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski]
13340 Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
13341 Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17715 The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17716 Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
17703 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
17714 Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
17705 Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17700 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17704 Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17710 Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
17706 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
17701 Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17708 Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
23061 Free atheism should start by questioning its faith in humanity [Gray]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
23057 Gnosticism has a supreme creator God, giving way to a possibly hostile Demiurge [Gray]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
23056 Judaism only became monotheistic around 550 BCE [Gray]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
23055 Christians introduced the idea that a religion needs a creed [Gray]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
23058 Buddhism has no divinity or souls, and the aim is to lose the illusion of a self [Gray]